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This paper studies the determinants of the international synchro-
nization of business cycles. Surprisingly, countries that trade more do
not appear to have more synchronized cycles once other factors are
accounted for. On the other hand, the extent of co-‡uctuations in-
creases quite robustly with the income level, so that two rich countries
are unconditionally more synchronized. We develop a model where
this happens because the world moves from an unstable steady state
with full international specialization to a stable symmetric one. Simi-
lar countries produce similar goods and as a result experience sectoral
shocks that are of equal importance. By contrast, di¤erent income
levels re‡ect di¤erences in production patterns, where the North pro-
duces manufactures and the South agricultural goods. Since there is
no particular reason why stochastic developments in those two sectors
should be correlated with one another, we should expect less cyclical
comovement between a rich and a poor country. Finally, the model is
consistent with the tendency for trade amongst developed countries to
be mostly intra-industry.
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1“It is just not credible that the United States, or for that
matter Europe, can remain an oasis of prosperity una¤ected by a
world that is experiencing greatly increased stress”, Alan Greenspan,
Testimony before the Committee on the Budget, U.S. Senate,
September 23rd 1998.
1 Introduction
Upon reading the current press, there seems to be little doubt that it has
become impossible for countries to insulate themselves from foreign devel-
opments. Openness to trade is by far the most frequently cited culprit for
this apparent globalization of cycles: Japan enters a recession for purely do-
mestic reasons, and insofar as a signi…cant proportion of its exports target
the Japanese market, the rest of Asia cannot but su¤er from it. Within the
academic profession, however, few economists would agree that this is the
sole -or even most important- mechanism. There are two reasons to this
restraint. First, openness as measured for instance by the share of exports
to GDP rarely reaches levels compatible with promoting trade as the sole
responsible for co-‡uctuations, in particular for large economies1. Further,
as argued for instance by Krugman (1996), openness was by some measures
actually highest at the end of the nineteenth century, a period of history
hardly characterized by questions about globalization2. Second, economic
theory o¤ers no de…nite answer to the question of what drives the interna-
tional business cycles: building on Backus, Kehoe and Kydland (1994), some
argue that trade in intermediate goods channels domestic developments to
foreign suppliers; some introduce rigidities whereby policy surprises meant
to a¤ect domestic demand do have e¤ects across the border3; others …nally
argue that there is a signi…cant common component to the international
business cycle. Usual examples include the oil shocks, convergence in eco-
nomic policies or integrated capital markets.
This paper makes a …rst attempt at discriminating between these, and
in so doing provides an original view on the generation of international cy-
cles. We provide evidence on the determinants of co-‡uctuations, measured
1As is well-known, the …gure for the U.S. is around 12%. In Japan, it was 9.6% in
1995.
2Globalization is actually one of the prominent theses in Marx (1848), but with concern
for long-run predictions, rather than international di¤usions of economic ‡uctuations.
3See for instance Hornstein and Praschnick (1997) and Kollmann (1998) respectively.
2by GDP bilateral correlations for 136 countries taken from the Summers-
Heston dataset. Figure 1 reports those of the correlations that are positive4,
sorted geographically for lack of a better univariate criterion a priori. Casual
eyeballing points to three sub-groups where cycles are more synchronized:
within-Europe, between Europe and the Americas, and within the Ameri-
cas. This reduces somewhat the set of variables that ought to be included
as determinants of GDP synchronization, say to bilateral trade, the level
of aggregate income, geographic proximity and membership to international
agreements, of a trade or a monetary nature, but of course stays mute about
their relative importance5. The next section presents detailed evidence on
the determinants of the international synchronization of business cycles. The
punchline concerns the importance of the level of income, as measured by
GDP in the poorer country of the pair under study, which enters positively
even after controlling for bilateral trade and a large set of other variables6.
Thus, countries become unconditionally more synchronized as they grow:
given a level of bilateral trade, two rich countries co-‡uctuate more than
two poor ones, or than one poor and one rich, for that matter. We interpret
this as resulting from similarities in the economic structures of developed
economies, whose production structures have evolved endogenously to sim-
ilar patterns.
Our explanation of the international business cycle belongs therefore to
the last category above, in that it relies -though in an original way- on
the existence of common shocks. However, it does not rule out alternative
models grounded on trade-based transmission mechanisms, but quanti…es
as precisely as possible their relative importance, and brings the focus on a
novel approach. There is wide empirical support for the fact that production
structures are evolving to a common pattern, documented for instance in the
4Correlations are computed using …rst-di¤erences of GDP, and unit-root tests were
used to isolate a sub-sample of 61 countries where such …ltering is legitimate. Multivari-
ate regressions were conducted using the thus reduced sample. The correlations reported
are limited to the positive subset for clarity of exposition. If more trade leads to more
synchronization, it is indeed di¢cult to explain what leads to a negative correlation. Con-
clusions of the multivariate analysis remain however unchanged when including negative
correlations, and that is because highly correlated sub-groups of countries are positively
correlated.
5An important omission is Foreign Direct Investment, for which data is very incomplete.
We shall come back to this issue when discussing our results.
6These include distance between main cities, a dummy variable for adjacency, conti-
nental dummy variables and dummy variables for the EMS, the EU, NAFTA, the ASEAN
and the Andean Pact.
3literature on intra-industry trade7: the novelty in this paper is to relate that
evidence to international ‡uctuations. This is done in a two-country three-
sector model where …rms decide to enter a monopolistically competitive mar-
ket in the North or in the South. When making their choice, …rms balance
higher pro…ts -generated by standard demand linkages- against congestion
costs, that are assumed to be convex in the number of local …rms. We show
that there are two asymmetric equilibria, where most of the heterogenous
good is produced in one country, yet consumed in both, and one symmetric
equilibrium. Further, because of congestion costs, the asymmetric equilib-
ria are unstable, whereas the symmetric one is stable. Thus, the economy
eventually reaches a state where the share of the manufactured heteroge-
nous good is equal in both countries. Insofar as manufacturing production
is subjected to speci…c stochastic developments8, aggregate economies will
be more correlated in the symmetric case.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Next section presents
the empirical evidence. Section 3 presents a model of endogenous structural
change. Section 4 concludes.
7See among many others Krugman and Obstfeld (1997), Chapter 6, or Balassa (1966
and 1979).
8The issue whether unexpected developments occur mostly at the sectoral or at the
country level is in our opinion open. Papers by Stockman (1988) and Costello (1993)
provide evidence in favor of country e¤ects. In a recent paper, Wolf and Ghosh (1996)
argue however that the result is an artefact of aggregation, which averages away sectoral
shocks to a larger extent than national ones. Further, Fatas (1997) or Kollmann (1995)
discuss results in support of our assumption.
42 The Determinants of Co-Fluctuations
In this section, we present evidence on the determinants of the international
synchronization of business cycles. From a theoretical point of view, the issue
has mostly focused on the generation of positive international GDP correla-
tions - the celebrated quantity puzzle coined by Backus, Kehoe and Kydland
(1995)- for in the standard international real business cycle model, resources
go wherever the return to capital is highest and thus generate negatively cor-
related international ‡uctuations as soon as technological developments are
imperfectly correlated. This has given rise to numerous sophisticated at-
tempts to remedy that theoretical defect9. However, here we look at the
determinants of cross-sectional variation in the degree of synchronization,
and disregard the issue of what mechanism is at the source of positive cor-
relations of outputs. Thus, while related, most theoretical models of the
international business cycle will hardly have any implications relevant to
our purposes. In the seminal work of Backus, Kehoe and Kydland (1995),
it is for instance not clear how the degree of output synchronization will
change as bilateral trade rises with the share of foreign goods in domestic
production, and obtaining a clear answer becomes increasingly di¢cult with
the sophistication of the models used to explain positive GDP correlations.
We think of these experiments as the theoretical counterpart to our empir-
ical approach, and potentially as a way to discriminate between di¤erent
mechanisms.
Empirically, there are surprisingly few candidates to determine the de-
gree of synchronization between two countries. Canova and Dellas (1993)
…nd weak evidence supporting the importance of trade interdependence for
outputs cross-correlations, and Schmitt-Grohe (1998) shows that it is bla-
tantly insu¢cient to explain correlation between U.S and Canadian business
cycles. Although restricting her analysis to developed countries, Baxter
(1995) argues trade is for the most part in capital rather than in goods.
Therefore it ought to be an ingredient in dynamic stochastic general equi-
librium models of the international business cycle, thus pointing to foreign
9A very incomplete list includes for instance Kollmann (1998), who argues that pos-
itive correlations are a consequence of nominal rigidities, whereby domestic changes in
the money supply have e¤ects on domestic demand, on the foreign price level and thus
on foreign demand. In Kraay and Ventura (1997), foreign booms boost domestic em-
ployment through their e¤ect on labor-intensive commodity prices. Ambler, Cardia and
Zimmermann (1998) make domestic capital reallocation possible by introducing multi-
sector economies.
5direct investment as an important explanatory variable. A third approach
relies on the existence of a signi…cant common component to international
cycles. Canova (1993) argues that such a common component is a required
ingredient if calibrated models are to replicate the data. Lumsdaine and
Prasad (1997) and Forni and Reichlin (1997) take a purely empirical ap-
proach and …nd signi…cant evidence in support of a world business cycle.
Focusing on a particular episode, Backus and Gali (1995) contend that the
most important mechanism at play appears to work through interest rates,
likely to become increasingly inter-connected with globalization of world
capital markets. A fourth view, that we follow, consists in arguing that the
degree of exposure to the world business cycle varies across countries. For
instance, following the lines in Rodrik (1996), exposure may increase with
the degree of openness. Keller (1997) or Imbs (1998a) show for instance that
di¤usion of technology occurs with more intensity between trading partners
and close neighbors. Finally, as we will contend, exposure to common shocks
might increase with industrialization of the productive structure.
We …rst report anecdotal evidence, based on the whole Summers-Heston
dataset so as to shed preliminary light on the issue. We then turn to rigorous
multi-variate analysis.
2.1 Correlations Matrices
Figure 1 reports the positive bilateral correlations between Gross Domestic
Product (GDP) growth for 136 countries in the Summers-Heston dataset,
presented in the original geographic ordering10. As illustrated in Figure
2 as well, there is a large majority of positive correlations amongst the
9180 pairs, a con…rmation if need be of the so-called quantity puzzle, and
highly correlated sub-groups tend to be positively correlated. Thus including
negative correlations will not modify substantially our results, a fact we
…nd reassuring given the di¢culty of …nding an explanation for negatively
correlated ‡uctuations. Three clusters of countries stand out: correlations
within Europe, between Europe and the Americas, and within the Americas
10Augmented Dickey-Duller tests reject the presence of a unit-root for 75 of these coun-
tries. We however disregard this issue in this sub-section, essentially for illustrative pur-
poses.
6appear higher than in the rest of the world11. This leaves room for several
explanations.
First, geography, proximity or common institutional agreements, such
as the European Community, could matter independently, as suggested for
instance in Artis and Zhang (1996) where evidence is presented that a …xed
exchange rate regime imposes policy discipline that leads to conformity in
business cycles. Membership to international agreements could also confer
some credibility liable to foster trade or investment ‡ows. Or in a context
of multiple equilibria, proximity could lead to coordination on the same
equilibrium, for instance if the same language or media are shared. The
clear cluster of high bilateral correlations in Europe argues in favor of such
mechanisms, provided it prevails once other factors are accounted for.
Second, as often put forward, it could be because they trade that coun-
tries are more synchronized, and this in either one of three ways: through
more exposure to world cycles, through intense bilateral trade in goods, or
…nally through trade in capital or foreign direct investment. If it is openness
or trade in goods that is indeed decisive, it becomes hard to explain why Asia
is so weakly synchronized, since for instance in 1980, average trade within
Asia was almost three times higher than intra-American trade12. Figure 3
illustrates this point more generally: there, pairs are ordered by the degree
of openness13, and as is plain to see, no de…nite pattern appears. Of course,
measures of openness give a very imperfect picture of bilateral trade inten-
sity: we use instead data on bilateral exports between 61 countries of the
Summers-Heston sample, and present a plot of the relation with GDP cor-
relations in Figure 4. If apparently statistically signi…cant, the correlation is
surprisingly small, at around 0.28 using 1970 trade data14. Thus, explana-
tions based on di¤usion through trade in goods seem to …nd some support in
the data, though to an extent that remains unexplored, a fact that motivates
inclusion of a bilateral trade variable in our multivariate analysis.
11The Summers-Heston dates go from 1950 to 1992. Most countries have data from
1958 on. Correlation coe¢cients are of course estimated with error. Our arbitrary dis-
cretization into di¤erent ranges is meant to -imperfectly- re‡ect signi…cance levels. Back
of the envelope computations show that, given an average number of 35 observations, a
correlation above 0.3 is indeed signi…cant at the 5% level.
12When including the U.S and Canada, intra-American trade becomes four times higher
than in Asia. These two countries cannot however solely account for the wide discrepancy
between degrees of synchronization in Asia and in the Americas. The data is taken form
Frankel and Wei (1995).
13As measured by the ratio of the sum of exports and imports to GDP.
14The numbers using 1980 and 1990 trade data are 0.32 and 0.26, respectively.
7The issue of foreign direct investment (FDI) is more problematic, be it
only for lack of general enough data. Wei (1995) uses a dataset reporting
foreign direct investment originating from the …ve largest source countries.
However, it is of course insu¢cient to construct a bilateral FDI variable at
the same level of generality as the rest of the analysis15. Further, even if
such data did exist, it is not obvious to us what the relevant measure would
be: insofar as its impact presumably varies a lot with the characteristics of
the receiving country, FDI levels ought to be normalized somehow, perhaps
by the level of GDP at the receiving end, or by the total amount of FDI
received16. In Table 1, we report FDI stocks originating in France, Germany,
Japan, the U.K. and the U.S, both in levels and in proportion of the GDP in
the receiving country. There is of course no claim that the latter measure is
the relevant one in a theory of di¤usion through FDI17; rather, it is meant as
an example illustrating the extreme sensitivity of the ranking in destination
countries to the measure chosen. To take only one -striking- example, FDI
towards the U.S. is the most important in levels for all four countries in Table
1, but never appears in proportion of the U.S GDP. Furthermore, a non-
negligible number of developing countries enters the ranking, both in levels
and in shares, including Argentina, Iran, Gabon, Zimbabwe or Malaysia18.
Thus the claim that most FDI occurs amongst developed countries ought to
be quali…ed -or at least clari…ed- somewhat: while it is true in levels, a tiny
variation in Japanese FDI say to Vanuatu is likely to have tremendous e¤ects
on the receiving economy, in spite of the small amount. We think of this
evidence as an illustration of the di¢culty in …nding relevant information on
FDI, as well as the appropriate way to interpret it; furthermore it will help
justifying the probable robustness of the results in this paper to inclusion of
an hypothetical bilateral FDI variable.
An alternative hypothesis contends that cycle synchronization indepen-
dently re‡ects similarities in the productive structures of the correlated coun-
tries. If, as argued by numerous authors, stochastic developments at the
15Both the IMF and the OECD gather data on Foreign Direct Investment. However,
the IMF publications do not provide information about the country of origin, and the
OECD only reports FDI ‡ows originating from OECD countries.
16Given the state of data on FDI, this last speci…cation, though of crucial relevance to
understanding di¤usions of crises, remains for now inaccessible at the level of generality
we endeavor.
17This is however the measure used in Borensztein, De Gregorio and Lee (1995), who
attempt to estimate the growth e¤ects of FDI.
18Not to mention the strong sample selection bias that probably results from the fact
that missing observations are particularly numerous for developing countries.
8source of aggregate ‡uctuations occur at the sectoral level, economies with
a large number of common sectors will display correlated cycles. Since total
value added as measured by GDP is the best aggregate approximation of
the degree of industrialization, and thus of the likelihood that two countries
share a large number of sectors, we choose in Figure 5 to order correlations
according to the level of GDP in 1960 in each country. While not rigorously
established, we think of the matrix in Figure 5 as the most striking result
in the paper: each cell representing one bilateral GDP correlation almost
perfectly fade to clearer shades of gray as one moves down the distribution
of income. Thus, rich countries’ business cycles are more correlated. Next
section presents multivariate regressions that propose to verify whether this
is a robust result. Given the apparent weak role played by trade in goods,
and unclear evidence on FDI ‡ows, our prior is that results documented in
Figure 5 remain true unconditionally.
2.2 Cycles Synchronization and GDP Levels
In this part, we present formal con…rmation of the evidence based on corre-
lation matrices. We will conclude that the signi…cance of trade in accounting
for the degree of synchronization in cycles is weak at best, and mostly for
Europe. On the other hand as expected, our results promote the level of in-
come as an important unconditional determinant of GDP correlations, and
that with both statistical and economic signi…cance. The data is reduced
to 61 countries, where bilateral trade data exists19 and augmented Dickey-
Fuller tests could not reject the hypothesis of a unit-root in GDP20. The
countries, listed in appendix C, are used to compute 1830 bilateral corre-
lations between GDP growth rates, our dependent variable. Correlations
matrices direct our choice as to what variables ought to be included on
the right-hand side: bilateral trade, aggregate income level, geographic and
institutional variables. Table 2 presents results corresponding to di¤erent
speci…cations. Regression (i) includes the level of bilateral trade in 1970,
the sum of GDP in the two countries and their di¤erence21, and several
19The data comes from Frankel and Wei (1995). Bilateral trade is equal to the sum of
exports in both directions.
20Augmented Dickey-Fuller tests were run with the number of lags that maximized the
signi…cance level of the autoregressive coe¢cient away from one, i.e. the results are biased
towards rejection of the unit-root hypothesis.
21Country j is always the poorer of the pair, so that the di¤erence is positive. This
turns out useful in interpreting the results.
9geographic variables. Ideally, one would want to discriminate between pairs
of countries where both countries are rich, both are poor, and instances
where they have very di¤erent income levels. This is the justi…cation for
including both the sum and the di¤erence of GDPs. For all country pairs
(i, j), both Yi+Yj and Yi-Yj enter signi…cantly, though with opposite signs.
Trade enters signi…cantly in levels, with substantial economic signi…cance
as well: a one-standard-error increase in bilateral trade results in a corre-
lation higher by 0.0156. Quite surprisingly, the distance variable22 matters
positively, which points to probable mis-speci…cation. Adjacency and conti-
nental dummy variables for Europe and the Americas all enter signi…cantly
and with the expected signs. Remarkably enough given the relative small
number of independent variables, almost half of the cross-sectional variation
in cycle synchronization is explained with merely bilateral trade, income and
geographic considerations.
The coe¢cients on Yi+Yj and Yi-Yj are almost equal and of opposite
signs. Thus, Yj, income level in the poorer country, should impact posi-
tively GDP correlations, while the sign of Yi is ambiguous. Regression (ii),
where Min(Yi,Yj) and Max(Yi,Yj) are used in place of the previous income
variables shows that GDP correlations robustly increase with the income in
country j, the poorer of the pair, but that income in i does not matter. In-
sofar as all coe¢cients remain strikingly similar between regressions (i) and
(ii), and the performance of the estimation is essentially identical, it also
suggests that including both Yi+Yj and Yi-Yj carried unnecessary informa-
tion. In particular, our preferred interpretation is that GDP correlations
are higher when both countries are rich; allow only one country to become
poorer, and the impact on synchronization becomes insigni…cant.
As was already apparent from Figure 4, replacing the level of bilat-
eral trade by its logarithm improves the overall performance of the esti-
mation, as con…rmed in regression (iii). Furthermore, it makes the coef-
…cient on distance insigni…cant, a result more plausible than the previous
positive estimates. Regression (iv) replaces the continental variables with
dummies constructed using membership to several free trade agreements
without remarkable consequences, except for the interesting fact that all the
action is concentrated in the European Union23. The logarithm of trade
and Min(Yi,Yj) remain both statistically and economically signi…cant. An
increase of the income of the poorer country by one standard deviation,
22The distance between main cities.
23Artis and Zhang (1996) obtained a similar result.
10quite a substantial move, say from Ethiopia to Brazil in 1960, results in an
increase of the correlation by 0.06. Similarly, a one-standard-error increase
in bilateral trade intensity in 1970 results in a coe¢cient higher by 0.026.
The last three speci…cations in Table 2 check whether the trade and
income variables enter non-linearly. This is simply veri…ed by including
quadratic expressions in the estimations. First, as is evident from the three
regressions, the relation with the income variable is concave: richer countries
are indeed unconditionally more correlated, but to an extent that diminishes
as they grow richer. As will become clearer, the model developed in the
next section interprets this non-linearity as resulting from the presence of
congestion costs that make industrialization increasingly costly24. Further,
regressions (vi) and (vii) show the relation with bilateral trade to be convex,
signi…cant at the 5% con…dence level only, and with only weak economic
importance: using the estimates in (vii), a one-standard-error increase in
bilateral trade results in an increase of merely 0.009 in GDP correlation.
This is a very surprising result, given the omnipresence of arguments linking
bilateral trade to globalization of cycles, as well as the relative importance
of the income variable. Notice furthermore that the distance variable enters
independently in regression (vii), with the expected negative sign. It is
also very signi…cant, and along with the adjacency dummy variable, seems
to exhaust all geographic considerations. Finally, regression (vii) explains
close to half of the variability in GDP correlation, with a substantial increase
from speci…cation (i).
While it is not clear to us what theory underpins such claims, reverse
causality appears to have been an issue in the few papers tackling simi-
lar issues -though in a di¤erent context. In particular, Frankel and Rose
(1998) regress bilateral GDP correlations on measures of bilateral trade,
and use the positive estimate to argue that a monetary union, insofar as
it may boost trade, is likely to make member countries more synchronized
ex-post. In their estimation, they took particular care of reverse causal-
ity, arguing that “countries are likely to link their currencies deliberately to
those of their most important trading partners” and “exchange rate stabil-
ity could cause both high trade and co-ordinated business cycles”. We have
argued elsewhere25 that in our opinion, the issue is more that of an omitted
24Industrialization is modeled as an increase in the size of the sector that produces
a heterogenous good. Because of convex congestion costs, augmenting the share of the
economy hit by common shocks -industry, as opposed to a traditional sector- becomes
increasingly costly as the economy industrializes.
25See Imbs (1998b).
11variable bias. Further, running instrumental estimation as they do, using
bilateral distance and dummy variables for adjacency and the use of a com-
mon language seems inappropriate, insofar as at least the …rst two cannot
be excluded from the estimation, as evident for instance in regression (vii)26.
Third, it is not clear to us that there is indeed an issue of reverse causality: if
anything, models of international ‡uctuations predict that trade will be high
precisely when business cycles are out of phase27. Finally, our estimates of
the e¤ect of trade on cycle synchronization are already strikingly small: they
would only become smaller once the hypothetic bias is controlled for. As for
the income variable, it seems harder still to see how reverse causality could
be an issue. However, we present in Table 3 estimations that are meant
to take these potential defects into account. To do this, we compute GDP
correlations based on the second half of the sample only, from 1975 to 1992,
and regress those on the level of trade in 1970, and income in 1960, thus in
essence taking “lags” of the independent variables. Further, we include a
dummy variable representing membership to the European Monetary Sys-
tem, the only …xed exchange rate regime between 1975 and 1992 in the
sample, meant to correct for the omitted variable bias described in Frankel
and Rose (1998). Quite strikingly, coe¢cients remain of the same order of
magnitude, and R-squares remain high, at around 0.25. Despite the fact
that correlation coe¢cients are now computed with substantial error28, the
same variables still explain more than a quarter of cross-sectional variability
in synchronization29.
Table 4 completes the speci…cation search by verifying that the trade,
income and geographic variables enter the estimation independently rather
than through pairwise interaction. None of the interaction variables included
in the estimation seemed to matter, with one notable exception. As is clear
26Frankel and Rose (1998) actually do not present results on non-linear estimations.
However, at least the adjacency variable can never be excluded from the set of independent
variables.
27This is for instance the case in Backus et al (1994), where more trade will take place if
technology shocks are negatively correlated. Note that this does not mean that this type
of models have any prediction as to what happens when bilateral trade increases.
28Using at most 18 observations.
29In Imbs (1998b), we used quarterly data for 21 OECD countries to argue that the
Frankel and Rose (1998) results arose from …xed e¤ects, that caused jointly intense bi-
lateral trade and correlated cycles. While we think they are still at play here as far as
the coe¢cient on trade, they probably do not impinge on our main result, the importance
of income level for GDP correlation. To verify this rigorously would imply running esti-
mation of (vii), say, in …rst-di¤erences, an impossible task given the brevity of the time
series.
12from regressions (i) and (ii), bilateral trade matters more in explaining cycle
synchronization within Europe. Further, this interaction variable actually
exhausts the explanatory power of trade. Thus, if trade matters for cycle
synchronization, it is in Europe. This is interesting in at least two ways:
…rst, it casts yet more doubt on the claim that it is through trade that
‡uctuations cross borders in general. Second, insofar as the main di¤erence
between Europe and other free-trade areas or clusters of developed countries
is the presence of a …xed exchange rate regime, this points to substantial real
e¤ects of monetary arrangements, either on trade or directly on ‡uctuations.
Those were already alluded to in Artis and Zhang (1996) and Frankel and
Rose (1998), and potentially still fall victim to the …xed e¤ect criticism in
Imbs (1998). Some sensitivity analysis is conducted in Table 5, where the
trade variable is constructed using bilateral exports in 1980, and income
levels in 1975. All the results carry through. Notice that the coe¢cients
on Min(Yi,Yj) remained stable and signi…cant at the 1% con…dence level
at least in all twelve speci…cations in this paper: this is true of no other
variable.
133 A Model of Endogenous Structural Change
In this part, we present a model illustrating our main empirical …nding. In
the model, similar countries choose to produce similar goods and as a result
experience sectoral shocks that are of roughly equal importance. If instead
one country is rich and the other is poor, the rich country will be hit by
shocks to manufacturing and services, while the poor will be hit by shocks
to agriculture. Since there is no particular reason why those two sets of
shocks should be correlated with one another, we should expect less cyclical
co-movement between a rich and a poor country30. Insofar as our explana-
tion for GDP correlations relies on di¤erences in the productive structure
of the economy, we need a model of endogenous structural change. The so-
called new economic geography, based on the presence of transport costs and
local external e¤ects, provides a framework in which industrial agglomera-
tion occurs endogenously31, and is thus of relevance to the present purpose.
In recent work, Baldwin, Martin and Ottaviano (1998) -BMO henceforth-
present a model of economic geography unique in providing reduced form ex-
pressions and thus unequalled transparence in the mechanisms at play. We
choose to develop our illustrating model in their framework, though with
one added -crucial- component, namely the presence of convex congestion
costs.
In BMO as well as others, …rms in a monopolistically competitive sec-
tor decide to cluster, because their pro…ts depend on the local32 level of
expenditures, which in turn increases with the number of goods produced
locally33 - the now standard demand linkage. Thus, imperfect substitutes
of the heterogenous good -usually modeled as industries- are eventually all
produced in a given country or region. Here, we want to model precisely
the opposite mechanism: as they grow, countries are increasingly likely to
produce the same type of goods. We reverse the agglomeration result by
introducing some congestion costs of entry that increase convexly with the
30The model’s prediction is therefore that poor countries ought to be more synchonized
as well, insofar as they produce the same -traditional- goods. However, traditional goods
are usually associated with agriculture or exploitation of raw materials, and thus subjected
to idiosyncratic developments corresponding to world market prices. Crucially, we assume
there is international specialization in the production of traditional goods resulting from
pre-exisiting resources, that is imperfectly re‡ected in our assumption of a homogenous
traditional sector.
31See for instance Krugman (1991) or Krugman and Venables (1995, 1996)
32The very concept of locality requires the presence of transport costs.
33Through a variety of local external e¤ects. In BMO, it is because …rms are associated
with capital, whose earnings are spent locally.
14number of goods produced locally. The intuition is straightforward: when
deciding where to start business, …rms weigh the added pro…ts granted by
demand linkages against the cost of entering the market. Insofar as the
latter increases convexly with market size, full international specialization
can only occur in speci…c -and unstable- conditions, having to do with the
extent of transport costs relative to congestion costs. The world thus con-
verges sooner or later to a stable symmetric situation, where industrial goods
are produced in both countries in equal proportions. This state of a¤airs is
stable since the increase in pro…ts resulting from deviation always falls short
of the increase in costs. Interestingly, our model also predicts that countries
with similar income levels trade mostly within industries, a well-documented
fact.
The speci…cs of the model follow BMO closely. Consumers in the North
and the South derive utility from a traditional good T and imperfectly sub-
stitutable manufactures Mi (i = 1:::K +K¤), where K denotes the number
of varieties exploited -and invented- in the North, and a star indicates a
Southern variable. BMO identify the number of varieties in the manufac-
turing sector with a capital stock, thus making it possible to model the
innovation sector as producing capital. Insofar as agents own the capital
stock, an important implication is that wealth increases with the number of
varieties available. As will become clear, the ratio of Northern to world cap-
ital thus de…ned, SK ´ K
K+K¤ summarizes most of the model’s properties,
and characterizes fully the steady states of the economy. With exception of
the entry costs, assumed to increase with SK, the model is very similar to
BMO. We begin with a description of demand.
3.1 Demand
We shall assume that in each period consumers derive utility from the con-









¾ is the aggregate Northern34 consumption of all
manufacture varieties, CT is Northern consumption of the traditional good
34The model is described for the North. Characteristics in the South are isomorphic.
15T and 0 < ¾ < 1. With these notations, 1
1¡¾ is the elasticity of substitution
between varieties of the manufactured good. Each period, the consumer
maximizes her utility by solving simultaneously two problems: given a level
of -Northern- expenditures E she …rst chooses how much of M and T to
consume, and then allocates the remaining EM across di¤erent varieties of










where pM and pT are the prices of M and T, respectively. Furthermore,
consumers choose Ci, the demand for each variety, to maximize CM taking
















is the price index associated with the het-
erogenous manufactured good35. It is easy to see that pM CM = EM, and
thus:
E = pT CT + EM =
1 ¡ ®
®

















Notice that because of Chamberlinian competition, a given variety i is pro-
duced by one …rm only: when deciding of its pricing strategy, the …rm will
take into account demand arising from both the North and the South.
35The price index is not completely accurate since there are transport costs. For clarity
of exposition, this inexactitude is taken care of later, when analyzing …rms’ pricing policy.
163.2 Supply and Pricing
We assume that labor is immobile. One unit of T is produced with constant
returns using one unit of labor. Thus pro…t maximization in the T sector
requires that pT = w ´ 1, where the nominal wage has been normalized
to one. We assume ¾ units of labor are required to produce one unit of
Mi. Pro…t maximizing …rms in the M sector set price equal to marginal
cost, keeping in mind that they face the demand function in (2). Each …rm
is assumed to act atomistically, and thus fails to recognize that individual
pricing impacts the price index pM. The …rm that produces variety i chooses
pi and p¤
i, the price of variety i in the South, to maximize pro…ts subject to
(2), where pro…ts ¦M are given by:
¦M = (pi Ci ¡ w ¾ Ci) + (p¤
i C¤
i ¡ w ¾ ¿ C¤
i )
Transport costs decrease in 0 < ¿ < 1, and the de…nition for C¤
i follows
directly from (2). Pro…ts are maximized for
pi = p = 1 and p¤
i = p¤ = ¿
Using the price rule, maximized pro…ts are:











Introducing SK = K
K+K¤, SE = E
E+E¤ and µ = ¿
¾
¾¡1 maximized Northern
pro…ts can be rewritten
¦M =




SK + µ(1 ¡ SK)
+
µ(1 ¡ SE)
µSK + (1 ¡ SK)
¾
(3)








SK + µ(1 ¡ SK)
+
1 ¡ SE





In the absence of a …xed cost of entry in the manufacturing sector, an in…nite
number of …rms would start exploiting new varieties, and the competitive
result would obtain in the limit. Imperfect competition requires therefore
the presence of a cost of entry ´. We choose to model ´ as a quadratic
function of SK. This is to re‡ect the idea that exploitation of a new variety
requires the utilization of a resource that is in limited supply locally, such as
human capital, infrastructures or institutional administrative services. Thus
the production of new capital becomes increasingly costly as K rises. On the
other hand, world knowledge K+K¤ is assumed to render innovation easier
through international spillovers, as is now standard in models of perpetual
endogenous growth. Better world knowledge makes it possible to exploit
more e¢ciently scarce resources towards further innovation36. Furthermore,
the convexity assumption draws on the …nding that countries with similar
income levels display conformity in their cycles, but to an extent that de-
creases as income rises. In the model, income disparities are re‡ected by
di¤erences in the extent of industrialization: therefore, given an initial level
of North-South income disparity, it ought to be relatively more costly for
rich pairs of countries to achieve convergence to the same productive struc-
ture -i.e. convergence in income levels. This will be captured by convex
congestion costs: then, the cost of Southern catching-up rises with Southern
income level. Finally, ´ has a constant component, incurred irrespective
of the level of local or world knowledge. Examples include installment of
machines, buildings, purchase of licenses or bribes. The capital producing






where a > 0 and LI is labor used in the capital sector.
36Barro and Sala-I-Martin (1995) say page 216: ”the tendency to run out of new ideas
suggests that the cost [to create new types] would rise with [world knowledge]. But if
the concepts already discovered make it easier to come up with new ideas, then the cost
could fall with [world knowledge]. We assume that the two e¤ects roughly cancel.” The
di¤erence here is that the former e¤ect is assumed local.
37The particular functional form is of course chosen for computational convenience. We
however think the main intuition carries through in more general settings.
18We assume that payment of ´ confers a perpetual monopoly on the
variety exploited, and thus secures the present value of all future pro…ts38




¦M;t e¡r t dt = ´ = a + (SK)
2
By de…nition at the steady state, _ E = _ E¤ = _ SK = 0. The expression for
Northern pro…ts (3) shows that ¦M falls at the rate K + K¤ grows39, g.
Furthermore, intertemporal utility maximization yields the standard Euler
equation
_ E
E = r¡½, where ½ is the subjective discount rate and intertemporal
elasticity of substitution is assumed to be one. Thus at the steady state,
r = ½, and the zero pro…t condition simpli…es to:






Firms do not have any incentive to start business in the North whenever
¦ < ´ (½ + g). An equivalent expression holds in the South.
3.3.2 Expenditures
By de…nition, expenditures equal income net of investment. Northern agents
own all local labor and capital40, and derive income from rental of factors
or production. Investment corresponds in the model to labor hired in the
capital sector, LI. Thus,
E = L +¦ K ¡ LI
We show later under what conditions the number of steady states is limited
to three: one symmetric where both countries generate capital and SK = 1
2,
and two asymmetric where all innovation occurs in one country. To avoid
repetition, we focus on the asymmetric case where all innovation is Northern:
38Note that given the characteristics of the steady state, the zero-pro…t condition will
yield analogue results, up to a constant, when it is assumed instead that …rms pay ´ every
period.
39World growth is of course endogenous. It will however equal Northern growth g in all
the steady states considered.
40Factors of production are assumed immobile. Labor endowments are identical in the
two countries, which simpli…es somewhat the algebrae with innocuous consequences on
the results.
19then, in all steady states, new varieties of the heterogenous good are invented
in the North, so that it had better be the case that






where we made use of (4) and the fact that at all steady states, the economy
grows at the rate of innovation in the North. Then,
E = L + ½ ´ K
As in BMO, steady state expenditures are equal to transitory -labor- income
plus a …xed share of the wealth conferred by holdings of capital, equal to
the subjective discount rate ½. Rearranging,
SE =
E
E + E¤ =
L + ½ ´ K
2L + ½ ´ K + ½ ´¤ K¤






















Equations (5) and (6) form together a system in (SK;SE) whose solutions
determine the characteristics of the steady states of this economy.
3.4 Steady State Analysis and Stability
3.4.1 Steady States
We seek to characterize situations where the local share of world capital
remains constant, i.e. _ SK = 0. It is easy to see that at a steady state thus
de…ned SK (1 ¡Sk)(g ¡g¤) = 0 where g =
_ K
K and g¤ =
_ K¤
K¤ . In other
words, either industrialization -as measured by the number of varieties of
the heterogenous good- occurs at equal rates g = g¤ in the North and the
South, or world growth in varieties of manufactures originates in one country
only41.
41As mentioned, we focus on Northern industrialization for the latter asymmetric case.
20In the symmetric steady state, the zero pro…t condition holds with equal-






a + (1 ¡ SK)
2
However, pro…ts are given by (3) and (3’), so that we must have














a + (1 ¡ SK)
2 (7)
Simple manipulation of (6) shows that 1






K+K¤ + ½ a (1 ¡ SK) + ½ (1 ¡ SK)
3
L
K+K¤ + ½ a SK + ½ S3
K
(8)
It is easy to see that SK = 1
2 veri…es the system formed by (7) and (8),
and characterizes therefore an equilibrium steady state. Under very mild
conditions described in appendix A, it is also the only one where innovation
occurs in both countries. Thus, at the symmetric steady state, Northern
and Southern growth rates are identical, and the share of manufactures is
equal in both countries.
In the asymmetric steady state, we supposed that all new varieties were
invented in the North, i.e. SK = 1. It has to be the case that innovation
is not pro…table in the South, so that ¦¤ < ´¤(½ + g). However, entry is
pro…table in the North, implying that g = ¦
´ ¡½. Combining all restrictions






K+K¤ + ½(a + 1)
2L







K+K¤ + ½(a + 1)
#
< 1 (9)
In appendix B, we show that this will be true under some weak restric-
tions on 2L
K+K¤ and for µ1 < µ < µ2, where µ1 and µ2 are de…ned in the
appendix. Recall that transport costs decrease in ¿ and thus increase in
µ: the asymmetric equilibrium can only prevail for su¢ciently low levels of





< µ < µ2, there are two steady states. The characteristics
of the third -asymmetric- one are easy to infer from what precedes.
213.4.2 Stability
Consider an exogenous shift of one innovating …rm from the North to the
South - a fall in SK. Stability requires that the increase in relative South-
ern pro…tability, due to higher expenditures and thus higher pro…ts in the
South, be smaller than the increase in relative Southern costs, due to higher
congestion. In that case, the displaced …rm has no incentive to stay in the
South, and market forces will re-establish the initial production and trade
pattern. If on the other hand Southern relative pro…tability rises by more
than relative costs, the steady state is unstable. We now show that the
former applies in the symmetric and the latter in the asymmetric case. The
appendix provides an expression for -(SK) = ¦
¦¤ ¡
´
´¤ derived from (7) and
(8), that measures relative Northern pro…ts net of relative costs. If - > 0,
is it more pro…table to invent and produce new manufactures in the North.
On the other hand,
-(1) = A(1) + B (1) + C + D(1) + E < 0
The polynomials A(SK), B (SK), C, D(SK) and E are de…ned and shown to
be unambiguously negative in the appendix. Thus, when all manufacturing
production is agglomerated in the North, it is relatively more pro…table to
start industrializing the South, where congestion costs are lower. In other
words, the asymmetric steady state is unstable, and there will be incentive
for …rms to relocate for as long as -(SK) < 0, that is until the world reaches
the symmetric equilibrium where -(SK) = 0 by de…nition.
To examine stability of the symmetric steady state, we need to determine
how -(SK) responds to in…nitesimal changes in SK, and evaluate that dif-
ferential response for SK = 1
























Thus, a fall in SK results in a rise in Northern net relative pro…tability. The
rise in Southern pro…ts, brought about through higher relative southern
expenditures in (7), falls short of the rise in relative Southern costs. Thus,
the very …rm that was exogenously displaced to the South has a net incentive
to move back home.
223.4.3 Income Levels
We …nally provide veri…cation that income level disparity is maximized in
the asymmetric equilibrium, and shrinks as manufacturing relocates to the
South, on the transition path to the stable symmetric steady state. To see




M = (K + K¤)
®¾¡1
¾ [SK + µ(1 ¡ SK)]
®¾¡1
¾
Thus using the equivalent Southern de…nitions,
Y
Y ¤ =
[SK + µ(1 ¡ SK)]
® ¾¡1
¾






K+K¤ + ¦¤ (1 ¡ SK)
At the symmetric equilibrium pro…ts are equal, so that Y = Y ¤. However,
when SK = 1,
Y









The intuition is the same as in BMO: a high level of SK translates into
higher steady state wealth and a lower Northern price index. Insofar as syn-
chronized co-‡uctuations arise in this paper from similar sectoral structure,
maximum international specialization -the smallest possible correlation- is
assumed at the outset. We have shown this is an equilibrium where North-
ern income level is relatively higher. There, stochastic developments in the
traditional sector matter for the South, whereas shocks in manufacturing
only impact the North. Since there is no a priori reasons why these two sets
of shocks should be correlated with one another, co-movements between the
two countries are less cyclical. However, since that state of a¤airs is unsta-
ble, the world eventually reaches a situation where both countries produce
manufactures, in equal proportions, and have the same income level. A sig-
ni…cant share of each economy thus responds to similar developments, and
aggregate cycles are more correlated.
Because entering …rms …nd it optimal to exploit and produce unused va-
rieties rather than share the pro…ts on already produced manufactures, each
variety is produced by one …rm. It is in that sense that the manufacturing
sector expands in the South along the transition. Further, goods produced
in the South at the symmetric steady state are all di¤erent from goods in
the North. Thus, given preferences for diversity, they are all traded. The
model predicts a majority of intra-industry trade between countries with
similar income levels, as observed in the data.
234 Conclusion
This paper provides novel evidence on the determinants of the synchroniza-
tion of business cycles. Against many pundits’ views, we …nd that the extent
of bilateral trade has very little to do with GDP correlations, except perhaps
for European countries. On the other hand, we document the fact that pairs
of countries with higher aggregate income level experience business cycles
that are unconditionally more synchronized. This …nding is interpreted in
a model where international income disparities correspond to di¤erences in
production patterns, and thus to di¤erent degrees of exposure to common
stochastic developments. In our opinion, the approach developed here opens
the way to various extensions. On the modeling front, we can think of the
present …ndings as a set of additional “stylized facts” that calibrated dy-
namic stochastic general equilibrium models of the international business
cycle ought to reproduce. Thus, the relative unimportance of trade factors
should lead to rejection of some theoretical transmission mechanisms, while
the signi…cance of both geographic and income considerations may help se-
lect others. More generally, models of the international cycle often have
predictions on bilateral correlations of various variables, such as the price
level or real money balances. The empirical approach developed here could
be fruitfully extended to other macroeconomic aggregates. On the empirical
front, it is easy to imagine how a similar study based on lagged rather than
contemporaneous correlations could help bring in focus the issue of lagged
international di¤usion of crises and expansions. Trade factors might play a
very di¤erent role there.
24Appendix
A. Unicity of the Symmetric Steady State
We seek to establish under what conditions SK = 1
2 is the only solution
to (7) and (8). After tedious though simple manipulation, substituting (8)
in (7) yields
A(SK)[SK ¡ (1 ¡ SK)] + B(SK)
h
S2























A(SK) = ¡a(1 ¡ µ)
2 L
K+K¤ ¡ 2µ L
K+K3 SK (1 ¡ SK),
B (SK) = ¡½a2µ(µ ¡ 1) ¡ 2µ½a SK (1 ¡ SK) + ½µ S2




1 + µ2¢ L
K+K¤,
D(SK) = ¡½aµ(2µ ¡ 1) ¡ ½µ SK (1 ¡ SK),
E = ¡½µ2.
Recall that µ = ¿
¡ ¾
1¡¾ > 1 to see that C, D(SK) and E are all strictly
negative. Furthermore, A(SK) is strictly negative for µ > 1, i.e. pos-
itive transport costs. To sign B (SK), compute the discriminant ¢1 =
4a(a +µ ¡ 1) > 0. B (SK) is negative for
2a ¡
p
¢1 < SK (1 ¡ SK) < 2a +
p
¢1
However, it is easy to check that 2a¡
p
¢1 < 0 and 2a+
p
¢1 > 1 whenever
µ > 1
4a. Thus, if transport costs are su¢ciently higher than the …xed cost
of entry a, the only solution to the system formed by (7) and (8) is SK = 1
2.
Indeed, all the expressions between brackets are either strictly positive when
SK > 1
2 or strictly negative when SK < 1
2.
B. Existence of the Asymmetric Steady State
Rearranging (9) yields a quadratic equation in µ, that ought to be neg-














K + K¤ < 0 (9’)
The discriminant
¢2 = a2½2 (a + 1)










corresponding to (9) is positive whenever the ratio of world labor to capital
is not too high to start with. To see this, consider ¢2 a quadratic expression
in 2L
K+K¤, compute the corresponding discriminant ± = 4½2(2a + 1)(a + 1)
4
and notice that one of the two real roots is negative, and the other is given




Thus, ¢2 > 0 whenever 2L
K+K¤ < °, which if ensured at the outset will














K+K¤ + ½(a + 1)
i
Thus, (9’) will be negative for µ1 < µ < µ2. The asymmetric steady state
will exist for su¢ciently low transport costs, whenever µ < µ2.
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Bilateral Trade (log)Figure 5





0.1 < rho < 0.3
0.3 < rho < 0.5
0.5 < rho < 0.7
0.7 < rho Table 1 : FDI Stocks in 1989 – 1990
Top ten destinations for the five largest source countries – in level and in share of destination GDP
France Germany U.K. Japan U.S.
Level Share Level Share Level Share Level Share Level Share
U.S. Belux U.S. Ireland U.S. Singapore U.S. Panama Canada Panama
U.K. Switzerland Belux Belux Australia Ireland U.K. Vanuatu U.K. Switzerland
Belux Netherlands France Switzerland Netherlands Netherlands Panama Singapore Germany Ireland
Netherlands Ireland U.K. Austria Canada Barbados Australia Hong Kong Switzerland Canada
Spain Spain Netherlands Netherlands France Australia Netherlands Netherlands Netherlands Singapore
Italy U.K. Spain Spain Germany Zimbabwe Indonesia Australia Japan Netherlands
Germany Iran Italy France Spain NewZealand Hong Kong Belux Bermuda Gabon
Switzerland Argentina Switzerland Gabon Bermuda Panama Cayman Is. Papua N.G. France U.K
Iran Portugal Austria U.K. S. Africa Hong Kong Belux Fiji Brazil NewZealand
Canada Denmark Canada Denmark Switzerland Jamaica Brazil Malaysia Australia Hong Kong
Data is taken from Wei (1995). It is for 1989 in France and the U.K, and for 1990 in Germany, Japan and the
U.S. Observations exist mainly for developed receiving countries, though there are a few exceptions.Table 2 : Specification Search
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi) (vii)
Trade variables






















Yi+Yj 2.06 x 10
-5
[11.31]**
Yi-Yj -2.18 x 10
-5
[8.46]**































































































R-Square 0.465 0.463 0.469 0.474 0.480 0.482 0.486
Left-hand side variable is the correlation of GDP growth in countries i and j between 1950 and 1992. Estimation with Huber-








































































































Min (Yi, Yj) x ln(X70) 5.55 x 10
-6
[2.51]*
R-Square 0.486 0.496 0.499
Left-hand side variable is the correlation of GDP growth in countries i and j between 1950 and 1992. Estimation with Huber-






































Left-hand side variable is the correlation of GDP growth in countries i and j between 1975 and 1992. Estimation with Huber-









































R – Square 0.465 0.475
Measures of bilateral trade are taken in 1980, and income variables in 1975. The rest of the estimations is
conducted as previously.